ORDER To: Flight Lieutenant Paine
1. You are appointed officer
I/C rear party PAM KHAN
2. The following personnel will remain:
Sgt Turton Sgt Field F/Sgt Osborne LAC Bell Cpl. Constable
LAC. Austin LAC. Smith AC. Ward Cpl. Heath AC. Kilwin Sgt.
Stafford
3. You will provide and refuelling that may be required.
4 Parties to collect petrol will be sent from 109 as long as
circumstances permit.
5. You will move at your own discretion if
situation warrants, first informing Burwing Headquarters by wireless, and
demolishing equipment.
6. On receipt of code word SCRAM you will
destroy any remaining stocks and equipment and proceed to MYTCHINA.
Squadron Leader Senior Administrative Officer Royal Air Force in
BURMA
Given at PAMKHAN On the 30th April 1942
To Air Commodore From F/lt H S Paine
Report
Sir I beg to report that on the morning of 1/5/42 Burwing
split into two parties - one party under W/C Devitt to proceed to
Myitkyina en route for India and the main party under G/Capt. Singer en
route for on the main Burma road en route for China. As O/C rear party
I was detailed to remain at Pam Khan (copy of orders attached). The
departure of Burwing appeared to be the signal for the firing of Pam Khan
and every building around us was burning. I immediately ordered all
clothing and equipment left behind by Burwing to be collected and burnt.
The AVG (1st American Volunteer Group) had already evacuated and the
CAMCO factory was already burning. During the night of the 1/5/42 - We
were visited by Major O'Malley A.L.O (Air Liason Officer) attached to
Burwing who gave me reassuring reports of the situation. On the morning
of the 2/5/42 F/O Durnford Wood took off in his Hurricane with the
intention of calling at Myitkyina if weather conditions allowed. The
aerodrome at haywing was still unserviceable owing to the continuous rain
so I ordered the unserviceable planes to be burnt. A large quantity of
CAMCO oil was found, so this was destroyed. At 05.00 hrs on the 3/5/42
I saw two lorries being driven up to the fort, so I aroused the men and
went over to the fort to investigate. The lorries contained CAMCO workers
and were driven by BOR's from 17 squadron who were attached to the AVG's
They were Sgt Boylan, Cpl Brighton. Lac Strinder and Ac Wardrope. They
said they had orders to rejoin the AVG and in any case could not leave the
lorries as none of the natives could drive. I allowed them to proceed into
china. Soon after I heard bursts of Machine gun fire and saw many
riderless cavalry horses galloping in our direction. I immediately gave
orders to destroy the remaining serviceable plane - to fire all petrol
stocks, unserviceable vehicles and buildings. Although all preparations
had been made, the aerodrome was so far away and the petrol so widely
dispersed that we were not ready to move off until 0800 hrs. Before we
had gone half a mile towards the cross road at NAMKAM we saw three Indian
cavalry who said they were going to Bhamo. I told them they were on the
wrong road and cannot replace their steps to Namkam. They told me that
this was impossible as the Japs were already in possession of Namkam and
had 25 tanks already over the bridge 3 miles away. I decided that it was
too late to retreat and ordered to convoy to proceed and get through
Namkam if possible. Machine gun fire had died down and we reached the
cross roads and turned up the road to Bhamo without further incident.
We reached Bhamo at 12.30 where we stayed for 1 hour for food. When we
left, Bhamo was burning fiercely and the road was packed with evacuees.
From Bhamo onwards the journey was extremely difficult - the evacuees were
too much of a hurry to unload their vehicles before going over the fragile
bamboo bridges so many of them had to be repaired many times before our
turn came to go over. We lost our lorry when it went through a bridge
into the river and from then on the men had to cling on to the sides of a
petrol bowser that I had brought as a second vehicle. All transport was
left 20 miles south of Myitkyina where the river ferry had sunk and the
personnel swam across the river supported by a bamboo raft. We arrived
at Myitkyina at 05.30hrs on 5/5/42 and reported to RAF HQ. We then
proceeded to the aerodrome where we organised the planes as they arrived
and trying to keep some order among the civil evacuees. The medical
authorities were especially grateful for our help especially when they
heard all the ranks refuse to passage in a plane until all the wounded had
been evacuated. At about 11.00 the next morning a S/Ldr pilot ordered
me and my party to board his plane. Just before the plane was airborne a
bomb exploded under the port wing and rendered the plane unserviceable.
The only other plane in the aerodrome was machine gunned and out of
action. We got all the wounded out of the planes before another Jap
machine appeared and set fire to the plane that had not been bombed.
The dead were then buried in bomb craters on the aerodrome and the
aerodrome was repaired. A force of 7 aeroplanes came over and bombed
and machine gunned the aerodrome in the afternoon but no further damage
was done to the runway. Just before dusk another plane landed and
evacuated the remaining wounded and the whole of the RAF personnel in
Myitkyina. The task of demolishing LOYWING and our subsequent
evacuation could not have been bought to a successful conclusion without
the courageous unthinking efforts of F/Sgt Osborne, Sgt Turton, Sgt Field
who despite lack of sleep, worked unceasingly in helping the wounded in
Myitkyina aerodrome.
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